What Can Change The Physical Makeup Of The Brain Psychology

The Physicality of Psychology 
in Personal Identity

John Grady

Written for PHIL-P300

---

Introduction

Throughout the discussion on the nature of personal identity, many arguments accept been made as to the conditions necessary to confirm its presence. These arguments tend to circulate effectually the idea that personal identity is associated with either a continuity of psychology or body. In the dialogue of Identity, actual and psychological weather for continuity of identity seem to be considered as two separate criteria. I would suggest, nonetheless, that while psychological continuity in some class is what we seem to encounter equally important in reference to sameness of person, that it is purely derived from bodily continuity. In the intent to mensurate personal identity through psychology, nosotros are in actuality mistaking psychological continuity for symptoms of a specific form of concrete continuity as testify by the straight interactions between the state of the trunk and state of heed. I think it is non simply possible, but pertinent and necessary to draw psychological continuity as a facet and subset of bodily continuity rather than as a divide and competing criteria.

History of the Discussion

In order to fully understand the gravity of this assertion, 1 must first understand the background on which this assertion rests as a destination cannot be fully comprehended without understanding the starting betoken.

The history of modern ideas on the nature of Personal Identity can be said to start with John Locke'southward essay, "Of Identity and Diversity". This would become the groundwork for the conversation on identity of what it takes for personhood to be and be sustained over the grade of time. In his essay, he asserts what he believes to be sufficient for objects to be identical over time, be it inanimate affair, unthinking organisms, animals, or humans. He is also the first to make use of concepts of body, mind, the thinking substance, and consciousness. Locke's essay stands every bit an attempt to quantify personhood and the requirements for personal identity over time. Locke himself asserts that personal identity consist in consciousness, simply the criterion fix through his piece of work would give ascent to a much larger dialogue on the subject. The evolution of the discussion will be broken downward by criteria for personal identity, their history, evolution, and problems each face.

Consciousness, Memory, and Psychological Continuity

The concept of psychological continuity as a criterion for personal identity is an extension of John Locke's original criteria for personal identity. This is the belief that sameness of conscious psychological experience is what is necessary and sufficient for sameness of person over time. It tin exist reduced roughly to the idea that personhood can exist extended merely into areas that one tin remember. According to these views, if I cannot remember past actions or experiences as my own, then I am non the person who did or experienced those things. Problems arise with this criterion for personal identity in the way of circularity; consciousness presupposes personal identity and seems to demonstrate self-affirming characteristics equally a result. The post-obit statement is an example of this result:

"I am the same person if and only if I tin [remember/exist conscious/conceive] of past actions as my own"

The issues of circularity lie in the fact that this argument necessitates the existence of personal identity even before it requires memory or consciousness to confirm its presence. Past asserting that "I" am the same person as "I" was if "I" can conceive of "my" past actions, we are making personal identity the metric of itself rather than consciousness or memory. Many take addressed this circularity by asserting causal relationship between past and future selves:

"I am the aforementioned person if and only if my [memory/ consciousness/ conception] of by actions creates a causal relation between my electric current self and a past entity"

Or even, famously, by attempting to remove the thought of "cocky," and the concept of identity entirely, from the very act of consciousness and memory every bit Derek Parfit did in his essay, "Personal Identity." Parfit uses retentiveness in a way that forgoes the assumption that ane's memories belong to their ain experience in an attempt to suspension the circularity inherent in retentiveness based criteria for personal identity chosen q-memory. His exclamation is as follows:

I take a belief that possesses the post-obit characteristics (q-memory):

• The conventionalities feels like a retentiveness
• Somebody (not necessarily the person recalling the event) experienced the event that the belief is related to
• This conventionalities was directly caused by the encephalon storing information of the feel

I am the same person if and but if my q-memory of an event connects my electric current cocky to a by entity.

The applied outcome of this is that Parfit has created a criteria for personal identity through psychological continuity that does not autumn prey to circularity by removing the self as the entity that must have experienced and remembered by events recalled by the consciousness.

Concrete Continuity as Criteria for Personal Identity

Concrete continuity every bit criteria for personal identity also stems fundamentally from John Locke'due south ideas on what information technology means for an object, animal, or man to be the same over time. Very simply, an object is the same if it composed of the exact amount and system of affair over time. Plants and animate being (and subsequently humans) can lose and gain matter constantly over the course of their lifetime, but and then long as the movement of thing supports the beingness of a single organism, information technology tin be considered to exist the same over time. In brusque:

 "I am the same person over fourth dimension if there is a continuity of organism"

This view is known equally Animalism and is the idea that people are entirely constituted by their bodies. It is controversial within the philosophical community and is widely criticized on the grounds that, according to this simple model of personal identity, a person should be considered to remain with their body in situations where the brain is removed or transplanted. Despite this, its simplicity and accurate existent-earth applicability get in an attractive perspective for many.

More specific views of physical continuity tend to circumduct around the encephalon. These ideas reason that the encephalon is particular facet of the body that effects personal identity. To some, this idea seems more intuitive than animate being-animalism as it places more weight on the fact that not all thing in body is every bit of import to continuity of identity. In fact, well-nigh theories of brain-based bodily continuity fifty-fifty condone the residue of the body entirely, asserting:

 "I am the same person over time if there is a continuity of brain"

This, much like brute-lust, serves to create simple and hands analyzable criteria for personal identity, but this view suffers much in the same mode that views of psychological continuity does in that it tin be argued that continuity of the brain does not necessarily comprehend everything that we care about in terms of persons or identity. For example, an opponent of brain-based actual continuity might suggest that in the case of two individuals switching brains, an individual'due south loved ones might feel hardship and confusion dealing with the this effect. Important aspects of a person they intendance about have been divided, separated, and diluted by aspects of a split identity (in this case, listen and body) and, as a consequence, it is unclear how 1 should logically feel or react in this situation, showing that there may be something more at play than what brain-based bodily continuity theories tin can account for.

The Interactions Between Body and Mind

The general dialogue between these two criteria for personal identity tends to form a design of proponents of one school of thought claiming that the other is unable to encompass the full scope of the issue. In light of the large corporeality of logical insight given past each side, it would seem to make it very difficult to definitively claim that any theory of actual or psychological continuity is sufficient to accurately represent the behavior of personal identity. This leads many to propose that each are inaccurate and do not finer depict what it means to be the aforementioned person over time, and that personal identity is ultimate and unanalyzable. While I call up information technology is correct to say that neither of these views adequately represent the solution to the questions that personal identity presents, I also don't believe that both are wrong. In fact, I would argue, despite the seemingly contradictory dialogue, that each of these views is, to an extent, right. The only thing they are missing is each other.

As a result of this view of listen-trunk connectedness, nosotros must assume, if in that location is nothing outside of the realm of the body and resultant psychology that is important to us in terms of personal identity, that the body encompasses all that we should exist concerned with. We must then come up to the conclusion that having the aforementioned body is necessary and sufficient for sameness of person. To assert this connectedness and its implications, nosotros volition observe a series of cases in which the body can be said to contain and have an effect on areas of concern in views of psychological continuity.

Hormones

Starting on a relatively small scale, the first case examined volition be that of hormones. Hormones are chemicals that the body excretes internally into the blood stream in response to changing environments. This can exist due to exposure to stress, temperature, or even diet. These chemicals flow throughout the circulatory system causing change all over the body. Ane organ that is affected by this arrangement is the brain. The presence of sure chemicals amongst the nerve cells causes alteration in circuitry and fifty-fifty structure of the brain with extremely consistent effects. It has been observed that the release of these chemicals into the torso can exhibit a change on the encephalon and psychology. For example, sex stimulating hormones FSH and LH show comprehensive effects on many aspects of mental states, such as attention, motor control, mood, and memory. This would seem to confirm the statement that in that location is, in fact, a relationship present betwixt alterations of psychology and alteration of body, specifically alteration of the brain. Furthermore, it would seem that alteration of brain and encephalon office issue in alterations in psychology. Because of this, we must reason that psychological aspects of person such as consciousness and memory tin can exist altered through concrete changes in the body.

External Substances

Having examined a situation in which the body is internally influenced by chemicals, let us shift focus to external influence from chemicals as a parallel event. The mechanisms of change in this case will not be drastically changed from the terminal involving hormones. External chemicals influence the torso and brain in much the same way, simply what will exist a notable departure in this example will exist the telescopic and intensity of alterations to psychology and mental states.

A normally understood instance in this instance are the furnishings of booze on the body, brain, and mind. The consumption of alcohol results in a physiological land known equally drunkenness. This is primarily a effect of the depressive effects that ethanol exhibits on the cardinal nervous system and causes progressive impairment in motor function, coordination, balance, decision making ability, and even memory and consciousness of activity. These are important examples because, nether a strict psychological criteria for personal identity, this alter of body has the capacity to erase continuity of retentiveness and consciousness. This would be sufficient to deem the sober and drunk person as distinct individuals, only I call up this brings upward some complications in what we deem the drunk and sober person responsible for in this case. Should the sober man be held accountable for an assail he committed or a traffic collision the drunk man caused if he is "not the same person," simply share a torso? By understanding this change in psychological continuity to be linked to a change in the brain, however, we see the advantages of a criteria for personal identity that parallels the body. Considering he is the same organism (albeit one with a slightly altered physiology) we must say that the sober man and the boozer man are the same person regardless of the lack of retentivity or consciousness connecting the two.

Medicinal Physical Alteration

Both previous mechanisms of internal and external chemic alteration of the mind are what could be called indirect means of investigating the relationship betwixt listen and body. They make good case studies for their commonality and applicability to existent-globe situations, but to truly observe the relationship in its most basic form, attending must be payed to the unusual circumstances that surround straight alterations to the encephalon. For this example, we look to Laura Klaming and Pim Haselager's essay on neuroethics, "Did My Encephalon Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Activity and Mental Competence." In their work, the authors examine a medical procedure meant to treat patients suffering from a scattering of neurological or psychiatric conditions through a process known as Deep Brain Stimulus. DBS is a non-invasive method of disabling parts of the brain without needing to physically destroy them in order to treat diseases derived from degradation of the brain. This is achieved by applying small-scale shocks to localized areas in the encephalon. It has proven markedly effective in many areas including handling of booze dependency and reduction of aggressive beliefs, but has occasionally shown complex side effects in some patients, significantly altering their psychology. The authors seek to examine "whether the employ of DBS does, or could nether certain circumstances, touch on the psychological continuity standardly taken to be feature of personal identity." They effort this through the case study of a Tourette's syndrome patient treated with DBS.

At the age of 43, an private suffering from uncontrollable tics began DBS treatment as a last resort for his Tourette's syndrome. The treatment was administered incrementally over a 12 month period. Eventually though, with increased intensity of stimulation, the patient began to develop a dissociative response to the treatment. This offered the treating physicians a unique opportunity to observe the correlation between the amplitude of cranial stimulation and extent of the patient's dissociative episodes. What was discovered was that as the amplitude of brain stimulation was increased, the patient was reduced to a state of irrational fright and kittenish disposition. He would hide in the corner of the hospital room, speaking nonsensically in a childish pitch, and fifty-fifty violently kick and resist if approached by the physicians. As before long as the aamplitude of the treatment was reduced or removed, he would revert to his traditionally characteristic behavior, simply would report having being overcome by negative childhood memories. What the physicians were observing in this reaction could exist said to be aught other than the neurological basis of psychology. Obviously this human being'due south character and personality are important to us and if for some reason this patients mind were to become stuck as that of a terrified child, we would consider it a tragedy. Simply practice nosotros and then treat this 43 year onetime man as a child? Ethically, I experience that to exercise and so is to ignore his dignity as an elder and a human beingness. Afterwards all, this change was only brought nearly by a fairly small physical alteration to the organ is responsible for creating his feel. The actual physical change could certainly exist said to be less astringent than, say, losing a limb, and I don't think this modify in body (even taking into the account the drastic change in mental state) is sufficient to assert a change in this person'southward identity. This would also extend to individuals suffering from conditions that severely affect retentivity and even those in vegetative states. Although their heed may non exist connected to their by, either in function or in whole, their loved ones still care about them. We have laws in place to protect them, and nosotros go along to treat them with the respect we afford to those who take these faculties. I believe the reason for this is considering we exercise hold a fundamental belief that identity follows the body in some regard.

Real-World Examples

The cases nosotros accept observed so far take gradually progressed our question on the nature of the relationship betwixt actual and psychological continuity. With hormones, we establish that there is, in fact, a relationship betwixt the states of the body and states of mind. With alcohol and external chemicals, nosotros find that the body-mind relationship is something that we tin can influence externally, and that the path of influence seems to be primarily body to psychology rather than psychology to body, or bidirectional. Cases of Deep Brain Stimulus further confirm the nature of the same relationship past explicitly altering the brain to the effect of a directly change in psychology and psychological continuity. This also shows us that it must be the brain that is responsible for the cosmos of the feel of consciousness. All these cases are clinical in nature for the purpose of establishing a base of operations of understanding through a logical progression, but now that the thesis has been established, we tin can examine many real earth examples that support our model that psychology is influenced past the body.

For this purpose, we shall examine the bizarre case of Phineas Gage. 25 years old at the time of the incident, Gage was a foreman managing the construction of a railway in the UK. On the 21^st of September, 1848, he was packing clay into a blasting site with an iron rod to concentrate the force of a futurity demolition when the powder ignited, causing an explosion. The premature detonation took the rod into the left side of Gage'due south face up, up and behind his left eye, and out the elevation of his cranium. Far from being killed, Gage didn't even lose consciousness from the incident and, later a lengthy stay at a hospital, even recovered enough to return to work after losing at least a teacup'southward worth of brain thing from his prefrontal cortex. During his recovery, still, complications began to arise. A former favorite among his peers, Phineas suffered significant graphic symbol alterations every bit consequence of the blow. Once a hardworking and interpersonal employee, Phineas had undergone a transformation to a much more than profane, impulsive, and irreverent, shadow of his past self to the point that his employers were unable to let him to maintain his position every bit Forman. His physician wrote this on Gage following his return to wellness:

The equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculties and animal propensities, seems to accept been destroyed. He is fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was non previously his custom), manifesting but niggling deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice when information technology conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously obstinate, withal arbitrary and vacillating, devising many plans of time to come performance, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned in turn for others actualization more than feasible. A child in his intellectual capacity and manifestations, he has the animal passions of a strong human being. Previous to his injury, though untrained in the schools, he possessed a well-balanced listen, and was looked upon by those who knew him as a shrewd, smart business man, very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans of operation. In this regard his mind was radically changed, then incomparably that his friends and acquaintances said he was "no longer Gage."

This is a popular case in the discussion of psychology as a facet of the physical realm, merely its infamy tends to obscure the fact that there exist and so many parallel situations. While they may not all include a tamping-rod lobotomy, what Neuroscientist David Eagleman describes equally "nature'due south tragic experiments" are great in number. Over the past 143 years, we have observed degeneration, strokes, and tumors change persons on fundamental levels all over the world. After noting these cases and their importance to our agreement of people, David has this to say on the brain and listen:

"The brain is a system whose operation is governed by the laws of chemistry and physics—with the terminate result that all of your thoughts, emotions, and decisions are produced past natural reactions following local laws to lowest potential energy. We are our brain and its chemicals, and any dialing of the knobs of your neural system changes who you are…"

"Consider the powerful effects of the minor molecules we telephone call narcotics. These molecules change consciousness, bear on knowledge, and navigate behavior. Nosotros are slave to these molecules. Tobacco, booze, and cocaine are self-administered universally for the purpose of mood changing. If we knew nothing else about neurobiology, the mere existence of narcotics would give u.s.a. all the evidence we crave that our behavior and psychology can be commandeered at the molecular level."

If anything can exist said for these cases information technology is certainly that psychology seems to exist every bit a symptom of the brain and torso. This would initially appear to support ideas of animalism in which persons are considered entirely their bodies, and while theories of mind-body connection would agree, animalism does not account for the importance that we also place on psychology. We care, I think, deeply almost psychological continuity. Information technology is why it'south loss in situations similar Phineas Cuff's and patients of Alzheimer'south are mourned amid loved ones and not dismissed as simply arbitrary changes of capricious and unimportant component of personhood. I would say that the importance we place on psychological continuity is the very reason why we seek then fervently to treat brain affliction and conditions. But where brute lust would disregard the importance we place in continuity of mind, views of pure psychological continuity would take that importance to the extent that nosotros lose sight of other aspects that we meet as contributing to personhood. The theory of mind-torso connectedness, nonetheless, finds a suitable center ground between these two by describing the vital cooperation and relations that they hold to one another.

Objections and Bug in Application

The Richness of the Human Experience

The heart ground created by this relation may still leave something to exist desired among those that see psychological continuity as something that cannot be reduced to such base of operations origins. Marya Schechtman, for example, writes in her essay, "Personhood and Personal Identity," against Parfit and his ideas of q-memories. She claims that to reverberate on a memory and remove the concept of cocky from it is impossible as there is a sure richness of feel that accompanies recollection of lived events. Schechtman might also say that reductionist views of psychological continuity such equally we have created here are unable to account for the rich and total nature of feel, and she would exist right in a sense. Neuroscience can't business relationship for the complexity and depth of the human feel. But by recognizing both its existence and its origin, I think the listen-body connectedness view comes closer than any other criteria for personal identity to bookkeeping for it.

When psychology is reduced to a byproduct of the makeup of the body, information technology is easy to leap to the determination that the torso is all that matters to us in the realm of personhood. One might contend that we don't interact with a brain or a torso, we collaborate with a person. That is to say, we interact with their character and memories and experience, but if all these things are produced direct by the encephalon, even if we can't quantify how they are produced, aren't nosotros, in a way, interacting with both? Yes, there is a certain intangibility in the realm of human experience that cannot be explained by a reductionist betoken of view, just reductionism certainly does non discount its presence or its magnitude. Our view of heed-body connectedness only seeks to accept a look under the hood, so to speak, at the mechanisms behind the incredible intricacies that constitute the mind. I would even go then far as to argue that not only does mind-body connectedness business relationship for the richness of the human experience, but that to assert a criterion for personhood that is based on this richness, yet fails to embrace the whorl of the trunk in its influence, is in actuality the view that least accounts for the depth of feel. Much like clockwork to a clock, we can observe the effects without agreement the inner workings, but to at least sympathize that there are inner workings in no manner discounts the product they orchestrate. To at least sympathise where our experience is born from in no way discounts the phenomenon that it manifests every bit.

Survival

A 2nd, more abstract objection that could be proposed to the theory of listen-body connectedness is that that criteria of concrete and psychological continuity simply aren't what we should be concerned about in questions of identity. This carries the discussion outside a realm that our theory can reply to. While near views tend to deal with one or the other and thus fit the suggested model in ane way or another, Derek Parfit discusses survival as a metric of personal relation over time. With this  Derek Parfit seems to forgo the notion of personal identity entirely. Discussing reactions to objections of circularity, Parfit states:

"Certain of import questions do presuppose a question most personal identity. Simply they tin can be freed of this presupposition. And when they are, the question most identity holds no importance."

Because he believes criteria involving personal identity must exist inherently circular or meaningless, he introduces his parallel notion of survival. Survival, co-ordinate to Parfit, is a gradient human relationship that can exist held between two entities over time. For case, Parfit explains a case in which a man, like an amoeba, divides into 2 parts, each sharing half of a divided brain. From here, there tin can be three outcomes:

1. The original individual has died as a issue of the division
2. The original man survives as only one of these halves
3. The original man survives every bit both of the resultant individuals.

Some might assert that the first scenario is what nosotros should consider to happen, but Parfit asserts that (and I think that this is pertinent) it would be counterintuitive to see this as "death," or "not survival". The second situation doesn't seem to be correct either. If each half is "exactly like," to assert that the outcomes must be different per each private undergoing the exact same process also seems to exist counterintuitive. Then either they both must or must non be considered to survive the original private, and, as discussed in the outset instance, it seems inappropriate to consider that the original person does non survive. As such, nosotros come up to the decision that both these new beings "survive" the original. This notion is extended to many situations in which a person can be divided. These seem to be situations that notions of personal identity (either of psychology or trunk) would have a hard time accounting for, but survival, equally a separate notion, seems to be able to explain the cases only and effectively.

Survival, according to Parfit, seems to be, at its core, a notion of causal relation. It avoids the circularity present in notions of personal identity by simply avoiding the notion of personal identity altogether. I believe Parfit would assert that survival is useful as a metric for (or, rather, an equivalent to) personal identity, giving prove for identity overtime without possessing self-affirming characteristics exhibited by other methods of measuring personhood overtime. It is this appeal, however, that is also its greatest shortcoming.

Survival as a measure out of causal relation between ii (or more) individuals over time seems to encompass aspects of what we care about in reference to identity in some respects, just co-ordinate to this model, survival can exist extended to many relationships that identity would never conceivably connect. 1'due south children could be considered to be continued in Parfit's survival relation for case. As an extension, and so would grandchildren, corking grandchildren, etc. Additionally, Given Parfit'southward potential outcomes in situations of fission, there are some issues that ascend. I agree that the state of affairs in which a person is divided into two does not seem to correspond expiry, and that it is pertinent to say that the original individual "survives" as 2 products, but if survival is a matter of degree (and I recall that the situation involving a parent and their relation to their children and grandchildren perfectly represents the slope nature or survival that Parfit suggests), then I think it stands that the relationship would be much weaker than Parfit seems to advise. I feel that it stands to reason, therefore, that caste of survival may exist an indicator of sameness of person, but that it fails exist an exact or precise metric with which to estimate the aspects that we care well-nigh in reference to personhood itself such every bit responsibility, liability, and recognizing distinctness among other individuals. Because of this, I believe that while survival may be a measure of something, that it is non an adequate measure of what we care about in relation to personhood and therefor is not an acceptable replacement for our model of physical continuity as a benchmark for personal identity.

The Soul

A 2nd objection that would extend beyond the matters that are covered by the thesis would be matters of the soul. This is an interesting argument in that it adds little in substance to the discussion of personal identity while also being impossible to show or disprove every bit a issue of using the natural world as prove. Equally a issue, information technology is a criterion for personal identity that lies outside of what the combination of physical and psychological continuity embrace and must be discussed for its implications in our theory.

John Locke makes mention of the soul and its office in identity. In his essay, "On Identity and Diverseness," Locke postulates on how a soul-based criteria for personal identity would operate. Using this model, sameness or continuity of soul would equate to sameness of person. The soul is said to be as separate from, withal within the trunk and mind. It is because of this that it should be considered as a competing criteria for personal identity. While a soul based criteria for personal identity is simple, information technology carries with it some major complications. Locke discusses these, bringing to low-cal the fact that if my soul were taken by God overnight, I would wake in the morning time and not exist the same person. The main effect existence that nobody, including myself, would be aware that I am not the same person as the 1 that went to sleep in my body, with my mind. I would think that I was the aforementioned person, only according to a soul based criteria for personal identity, I would exist incorrect; the person that went to bed that night would be dead. Even more complicated still, at that place would exist no style to tell. Equally such, how do I know that this didn't happen last night? An hour ago? How do I even know that it is not happening now as I write this? At that place is no way to find or account for states of the soul or the modify in identity that information technology might affect. This creates uncertainty in an area of life and death. If my soul (which may but persist for a short time) changes, the person that I used to be is simply dead. Furthermore, how does 1 know this doesn't happen often, on the hr even? People could conceivably simply "last" minutes.

It is important to note hither that there is nothing that would "disprove" the existence of the soul. I feel that to contend against something so intangible would be gainless. Rather, I think it is important to realize that whether or not the soul does be, it is not what we should be concerned almost it terms of our identity. Arguments for the importance of the soul in identity are very simplistic, simply carry with them some troubling implications in their application. It would seem unwise to base our criteria of personal identity at all on a notion that is unobservable and as a upshot leave u.s. fundamentally in the dark about our own identity. Equally mentioned before, the difficulty in addressing concepts of the soul is that these notions are very difficult to dispel or ratify. Every bit such, instead of fighting to assert that the soul does non exist, information technology is more pertinent to show here that even if souls do exist, they may non be the key to personal identity.

Conclusion

This essay has sought to constitute that the heed resides inside the body and that psychological continuity is a symptom of concrete continuity. Furthermore, given the testify, it seems pertinent to affirm that physical continuity (especially only not express to the aspects that constitute psychology) are and should exist what people are concerned about in cases of personal identity. Its simplicity deals extremely well in conventional application much like animalism, but the additional emphasis that mind-body connectedness places on psychological continuity also accounts for the brain and the importance information technology plays in the creation of consciousness and the human being feel. This avoids some of the issues of over-simplicity faced by pure animalism while yet maintaining a high caste of integrity and clarity. In matters where physical and psychological states are concerned, this is an splendid model of how we should measure personal identity. In theoretical situations, it may lead to less conclusive answers, merely I feel that theoretically practicality, while important, should come 2d to applicability in the globe nosotros live in. Perhaps, in a future time when the soul can exist located, brains can be transplanted, or people tin be fragmented, other more than comprehensive solutions may exist needed. Until then, our body is all that we have to our name and is thus all that we have to measure our names past.

---

Source: https://invocationsiu.wordpress.com/2016/11/02/the-physicality-of-psychology-%E2%80%A8in-personal-identity/

Posted by: dahmsthallusithe.blogspot.com

Share this post